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Abstract
Deep-learning based classification algorithms have been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks: minor
changes to the input of classifiers can dramatically change their outputs, while being imperceptible to humans.
In this paper, we present a simple hypothesis about a feature compression property of artificial intelligence
(AI) classifiers and present theoretical arguments to show that this hypothesis successfully accounts for the
observed fragility of AI classifiers to small adversarial perturbations. Drawing on ideas from information and
coding theory, we propose a general class of defenses for detecting classifier errors caused by abnormally small
input perturbations. We further show theoretical guarantees for the performance of this detection method. We
present experimental results with (a) a voice recognition system, and (b) a digit recognition system using the
MNIST database, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense methods. The ideas in this paper
are motivated by a simple analogy between AI classifiers and the standard Shannon model of a communication
system.
Keywords: Adversarial attacks, anomaly detection, machine learning, deep learning, robustness analysis, non-
linear classifiers, generative model
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1 Introduction
Recent advances in machine learning have led to the invention of complex classification systems that are very
successful in detecting features in datasets such as images, hand-written texts, or audio recordings. However,
recent works have also discovered what appears to be a universal property of AI classifiers: vulnerability to small
adversarial perturbations. Specifically, we know that it is possible to design “adversarial attacks” that manipulate
the output of AI classifiers arbitrarily by making small carefully-chosen modifications to the input. Many such
successful attacks only require imperceptibly small perturbations of the inputs, which makes these attacks almost
undetectable. Thus AI classifiers exhibit two seemingly contradictory properties: (a) high classification accuracy
even in very noisy conditions, and (b) high sensitivity to very small adversarial perturbations. In this paper, we
will use the term “adversarial fragility” to refer to this property (b).
The importance of the adversarial fragility problem is widely recognized in the AI community and there now
exists a vast and growing literature studying this property, see e.g. [1, 25, 55] for a comprehensive survey. These
studies, however, have not yet resulted in a consensus on two important questions: (a) a theoretical explanation
for adversarial fragility, and (b) a general and systematic defense against adversarial attacks. Instead, we currently
have multiple competing theoretical explanations, multiple defense strategies based on both theoretical and heuristic
ideas and many methods for generating adversarial examples for AI classifiers. Theoretical hypotheses from the
literature include (a) quasi-linearity/smoothness of the decision function in AI classifiers [22], (b) high curvature of
the decision boundary [20] and (c) closeness of the classification boundary to the data sub-manifold [49]. Defenses
against adversarial attacks have also evolved from early methods using gradient masking [38], to more sophisticated
recent methods such as adversarial training where an AI system is specifically subjected to adversarial attacks as
part of its training process [50], and defensive distillation [40]. These new defenses in turn motivate the development
of more sophisticated attacks [8] in an ongoing arms race.
In this paper, we show that property “adversarial fragility” is an unavoidable consequence of a simple “feature
compression” hypothesis about AI classifiers. This hypothesis is illustrated in Fig. 3: we assume that the output of
AI classifiers is a function of a highly compressed version of the input. More precisely, we assume that the output
of AI classifiers is a function of an intermediate set of variables of much smaller dimension than the input. The
intuition behind this hypothesis is as follows. AI classifiers typically take high-dimensional inputs e.g. image pixels,
audio samples, and produce a discrete label as output. The input signals (a) contain a great deal of redundancy, and
(b) depend on a large number of irrelevant variables that are unrelated to the output labels. Efficient classifiers,
therefore, often remove a large amount of redundant and/or irrelevant information from the inputs before making a
classification decision. We show in this paper that adversarial fragility is an immediate and necessary consequence
of this “feature compression” property.
Certain types of AI systems can be shown to satisfy the feature compression property simply as a consequence
of their structure. For instance, AI classifiers for the MNIST dataset [29] typically feature a final layer in the neural
network architecture that consists of softmax over a 10× 1 real-numbered vector corresponding to the 10 different
label values; this amounts to a substantial dimension reduction from the 28 × 28 = 784 dimensional pixel vector
at the inputs. More generally, there is some empirical evidence showing that AI classifiers actively compress their
inputs during their training process [46]. The distance between two data samples in high dimensional space will
always be larger than that between their low dimensional representations. This can allow small perturbations in
high dimensional space to cause low dimensional representations in one decision region move to another decision
region. Please see Figure 1 for an illustration.
Our proposed explanation of adversarial fragility also immediately leads to an obvious and very powerful defense:
if we enhance a classifier with a generative model that at least partially “decompresses” the classifier’s output,
and compare it with the raw input signal, it becomes easy to check when adversarial attacks produce classifier
outputs that are inconsistent with their inputs. Interestingly, while our theory is novel, other researchers have
recently developed defenses for AI classifiers against adversarial attacks that are consistent with our proposed
approach [21,44].
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(a) Projection of points in 3D space onto a 2D plane. (b) Projection of manifolds onto 1D segment.
Figure 1: Illustration of feature compression. Here the compression operator is a projection operator.
1.1 Related Works
Ever since Szegedy et al. pointed out the vulnerability of deep learning models in [48], the community has witnessed
a large volume of works on this topic, from the angle of either attackers or defenders. From the attackers’ side, various
types of attacking methods have been proposed in different scenarios, ranging from white-box attack where the
attackers know everything about the deep learning system such as system structure and weights, hyperparameters
and training data [10, 13, 22, 28, 36, 39, 42, 48] to black-box attacks where the attackers know nothing about the
system structure or parameters but only access to the queries of the system [6, 13, 16, 23, 35, 38]. Although the
existence of adversarial samples was originally pointed out in image classification tasks, the attacking methods
for generating adversarial samples have been applied to various applications such as text classification [30], object
detection [52,58], speech recognition [11], and autonomous driving [5].
From the defenders’ side, recently proposed methods for improving the safety of deep learning systems include
[2–4,9,12,18,19,21,26,27,31,32,34,37,40,43,45,47,50,53,56,57]. Most of these methods fall broadly into the following
several classes: (1) adversarial training where the adversarial samples are used for retraining the deep learning
systems [3,22,45,48,50]; (2) gradient masking where the deep learning system is designed to have an extremely flat
loss function landscape with respect to the perturbations in input samples [4, 40]; (3) feature discretization where
we simply discretize the features of samples (both benign samples and adversarial samples) before we feed it to the
deep learning systems [37, 57]; (4) generative model based approach where we find a sample from the distribution
of benign samples to approximate an arbitrary given sample, and then use the approximation as input for the deep
learning systems [18,21,26,31,32,43,47].
The vulnerability of deep learning systems and its ubiquitousness raised the security concerns about such systems,
and the community has been making attempts to explain the vulnerability phenomena [17,20,22,33,36,41,48,49,54]
either informally or rigorously. In [48], Szegedy et al. argued that the adversarial samples are low-probability
elements within the whole sample space, and less likely to be sampled to form a training or testing data set when
compared with those from training or testing data set. This results in the fact that the deep learning classifiers
cannot learn these adversarial samples and can easily make wrong decisions over these samples. Besides, since these
low-probability samples are scattered around the training or testing samples, the samples in training or testing
data set can be slightly perturbed to get these adversarial samples. In [22], Goodfellow et al. proposed a linearity
argument for explaining the existence of adversarial samples, which motivated them to develop a fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) for generating adversarial samples. Later on, some first attempts from the theoretical side are
made in [20, 41, 49]. A boundary tilting argument was proposed by Tanay et al. in [49] to explain the fragility of
linear classifiers, and they established conditions under which the fragility of classifiers can be avoided. Later on
in [20], Fawzi et al. investigated the adversarial attacking problem by analyzing the curvature properties of the
classifiers’ decision boundary. The most recent work on explaining the vulnerability of deep learning classifiers was
done by Romano et al. in [41] where they assumed a sparse representation model for the input of a deep learning
classifier.
In this paper, based on the feature compression properties of deep learning systems, we propose a new rigorous
theoretical understanding of the adversarial phenomena. Our explanation is distinct from previous work. Compared
with [22,48] which are empirical, our results are more rigorous. The results in [49] are applicable for linear classifiers,
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while our explanation holds for both linear and nonlinear classifiers. In [20], the authors exploited the curvature
condition of the decision boundary of the classifiers, while we only utilize the fact that the classifiers will always
compress high dimensional inputs to low dimensional latent codes before they make any decisions. Our results are
also different from [41] where they required the inputs to satisfy a sparse representation model, while we do not
need this assumption. Our theoretical explanation applies to both targeted and untargeted attacks, and is based
on an very intuitive and ubiquitous assumption, i.e., feature compression property.
In [21], the authors used class-dependent image reconstructions based on capsule networks to detect the presence
of adversarial attacks. The method in [21] is in spirit similar to our work: both approaches try to “decompress”
from classifier output (or from outputs of hidden layers), to reconstruct higher-dimensional signals, in order to
detect whether there exists adversarial attacks. Compared with [21], our trust-but-verify framework is inspired
by information and coding theory, and comes with theoretical performance guarantees. After we independently
worked on experiments of our trust-but-verify adversarial attack methods for MNIST dataset, we learned of the
work [44] which proposed an optimization-based image reconstruction approach via generative models, to perform
robust classification for MNIST dataset. The approach in [44] is close to one of our trust-but-verify approaches (see
Section 4.2.2) for MNIST dataset. Compared with [44], this paper has several differences: a) the trust-but-verify
approaches were inspired by information and coding theory and comes with corresponding theoretical performance
guarantees; b) the trust-but-verify approaches which are based optimizations can be more general, and can be used to
reconstruct functions of the higher-dimensional signals, rather than the full signals themselves (please see Section
2.1); c) the trust-but-verify approach is more computationally efficient than the method [44], without requiring
solving an optimization problem for every class (10 optimization problems for MNIST); and d) the trust-but-verify
approaches do not have to solve optimization problems to perform signal reconstructions, for example, the pixel
regeneration network (Section 4.2.1) for MNIST.
Notations: Within this paper, we denote the set {1, 2, · · · , N} by [N ], and the cardinality of a set S by |S|.
For a vector x ∈ RN , we use xS to refer to the sub-vector of x with entries specified by set S.
2 Problem Statement
Figure 2: Top: standard abstract model of a communication system; Bottom: abstract model of an AI classifier
system.
An AI classifier can be defined as a system that takes a high-dimensional vector as input and maps it to a
discrete set of labels. As an example, a voice-recognition AI takes as input a time series containing the samples of
an audio signal and outputs a string representing a sentence in English (or other spoken language). More concretely,
consider Fig. 2 which explores a simple analogy between an AI classification system and a digital communication
system.
The purpose of the AI system in Fig. 2 is to estimate the state of the world u ∈ U where the set of all possible
world states U is assumed to be finite and are enumerated as u1, u2 . . . , uNu , where Nu is the size of U . The input
y ∈ RN to the AI classifier is a noisy version of signals x ∈ RN , and x depend on u and on a number of extraneous
parameters v ∈ V. Note that the state ui is uniquely determined by its index or “label” i. The output of the AI
classifier is a state estimate uˆ ∈ U , or equivalently, its label.
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Figure 3: AI classifier with feature compression and its analogy with a communication decoder
The AI classifier in Fig. 2 is clearly analogous to a communication decoder: it looks at a set of noisy observations
and attempts to decide which out of a set of possible input signals x was originally “transmitted” over the “channel”,
which in the AI system models all signal impairments such as distortion, random noise and hostile attackers.
The “Signal Synthesis” block in the AI system maps input features into an observable signal x. In the abstract
model of Fig. 2, the synthesis function f(·) is deterministic with all random effects being absorbed into the “channel”
without loss of generality. Note that while the encoder in the communication system is under the control of its
designers, the signal synthesis in an AI system is determined by physical laws and is not in our control. However,
the most important difference between communication and AI systems is the presence of the nuisance parameters
v. For instance, in a voice recognition system, the input features consist of the text being spoken (u) and also a
very large number of other characteristics (v) of the speaker’s voice such as pitch, accent, dialect, loudness, emotion
etc. which together determine the mapping from a text to an audio signal. Thus there are a very large number
of different “codewords” c1 = f(u1,v1), c2 = f(u1,v2), . . . that encode the same label u1. Let us define the
“codeword set” for label i, i = 1 . . . Nu:
Xi .= {c ∈ RN : ∃v, c = f(ui,v)} (1)
We assume that the codeword sets Xi satisfy:
min
i,j, i 6=j
min
ci∈Xi, cj∈Xj
‖ci − cj‖ ≥ 2r0 (2)
for some r0 > 0, where ‖ · ‖ represents `2 norm. In other words, all valid codewords corresponding to different
labels i 6= j are separated by at least a distance 2r0. In the voice recognition example, under this assumption audio
signals corresponding to two different sentences must sound different. This guarantees the existence of the ideal
classifier defined as the function q∗(y) : RN → U that satisfies q∗ (f(ui,v)) = ui, ∀i, v ∈ V. By definition, the
ideal classifier maps any valid input signal to the correct label in the absence of noise.
Fig. 3 shows an abstract model of a classifier that is constrained to make final classification decisions based on
only a compressed version z of y. Specifically, we assume that there exists a compression function h : RN → RM ,
where M  N such that the classifier output q(y) : RN → U can be written as q(y) = g(h(y)), where g : RM → U
is a decision function. We define the “compressed codeword sets” as
Zi .= {z ∈ RM : v ∈ V, h(f(ui,v)) = z}.
We will assume that the sets Zi are disjoint so that the compression map h(y) preserves information in y about
the label i.
We will show that a classifier constrained to use only h(y) for decoding, even if designed optimally, can retain
its robustness to random noises, but is necessarily vulnerable to adversarial attacks that are significantly smaller
in magnitude. By contrast, uncompressed classifiers can be robust to both random and worst-case noise. In other
words, we show that adversarial fragility can be explained as an artifact of feature compression in decoders. We
will detail our analysis in Section 3.
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2.1 Trust but Verify: an Information Theory Inspired Defense against Adversarial
Attacks
We propose a general class of defenses, inspired by methods in information and coding theory, to detect the presence
of adversarial attacks. To motivate our proposed defense methods, consider a communication system, where a
decoder decodes the received signal y to message label “j”. To test the correctness of the decoded label j, the
receiver can “decompress” label j by re-encoding it to its corresponding codeword cj , and check whether the pair
input x = cj and output y are consistent, under the communication channel model p(y|x). For example, in decoding
using typical sequences [14], the decoder checks whether the codeword cj is jointly typical with the received signal
y, namely whether the pair (cj ,y) follows the typical statistical behavior of the channel model. Sphere decoding
algorithms for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless communications check the statistics of the residual
noise (specifically, to check whether the noise vector is bounded within a sphere), to provide the maximum-likelihood
certificate property for the decoded result (or the decoded label) [24,51].
Similarly for AI classifiers, we propose to check whether the classification result label j is consistent with input
signal y, in order to detect adversarial attacks. Generally, we compute a consistency score sc(j,y) between label j
and y: the lower the score is, y and label j are more consistent with each other. Specifically, suppose the classifier
outputs label j for input signal y. Define cj(y) as:
cj(y)
.
= arg min
c∈Xj
‖y − c‖ , (3)
and define
dj(y)
.
= ‖y − cj(y)‖ . (4)
If we observe that dj(y) = ‖y − cj(y)‖ (namely the score function sc(j,y) ) is abnormally large, this means that the
observed signal y is far from any valid codeword f(uj ,v) with label j and we conclude that label j is inconsistent
with observations y. This, however, requires a feasible method for calculating cj(y) for a label j and signal y.
When, for a label j, there is one unique codeword corresponding to j, we can easily evaluate (4) and thus determine
whether label j is consistent with input y. However, as noted earlier, in AI classification problems, a label j
does not uniquely correspond to a single codeword; instead there is a large codeword set Xj associated with each
label j corresponding to different values of the nuisance parameters v. In this case, evaluating (4) will need a
conditional generative model mapping label j to all the possible corresponding codewords in Xi, using which we
perform optimization (3) to obtain (4). Under mild assumptions on the encoding function f(·), we can provide
theoretical guarantees on a detector assuming a well-functioning generative model.
Solving (3), however, can be computationally expensive since there can be a vast number of codewords cor-
responding to label j. To resolve the issue of high computational complexity of the former approach, we further
propose a more general, and sometimes more computationally efficient, approach for checking the consistency be-
tween label j and input signal y. We consider two functions: p(y) : RN → RP and ta(y) : RN → RQ, where P and
Q are two positive integers. Our approach checks the consistency between label j, p(y) and ta(y). Here j and p(y)
serve as prior information for the codewords, and, conditioning on them, we try to “predict” ta(y).
We compute a consistency score sc(j, p(y), ta(y)) between label j and y: the lower the score is, label j, p(y)
and ta(y) are more consistent with each other. One example of such a score is given by the following optimization
problem. We define cj(y, p(y), ta(y)) as:
cj(y, p(y), ta(y))
.
= arg min
c∈Xj ,p(c)∈N (p(y))
‖ta(y)− ta(c)‖ , (5)
where N (p(y)) means a neighborhood of p(y). We further define
dj(y, p(y), ta(y))
.
= ‖ta(y)− ta(cj(y, p(y), ta(y)))‖ . (6)
Similarly, if we observe that dj(y, p(y), ta(y))
.
= ‖ta(y)− ta(cj(y, p(y), ta(y)))‖ (namely sc(j, p(y), ta(y)) ) is
abnormally large, the observed signal y is far from any valid codeword f(uj ,v) with label j and we conclude that
label j is inconsistent with observations y. Compared with (4), the upshot of this approach is that there can be a
unique or a much smaller set of codewords c satisfying p(c) being in the neighborhood of p(y). Namely, assuming
label j is correct, there is often a sufficiently accurate prediction of ta(y), based on function p(y). Suppose that
the original signal x belongs to label i. Then we would pick functions p(y) and ta(y) such that, for different labels
i and j,
min
i,j,i 6=j
min
ci∈Xi, cj∈Xj ,p(cj)∈N (p(ci))
‖ta(ci)− ta(cj)‖ ≥ 2r1, (7)
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where r1 is a constant. The criterion (7) means that, even though a classier can be fooled into classifying y to label
j, a prediction ta(cj), conditioned on p(cj) ∈ N (p(y)), will be dramatically different from ta(y), thus leading to
the detection of the adversarial attacks.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we perform theoretical analysis of the effects of adversarial attacks and random noises on AI
classifiers. We assume that, for a signal y ∈ RN , an ideal classifier will classify y to label i, if there exits a codeword
c = f(ui,vi) ∈ Xi for ui and a certain vi, such that ‖y − c‖ ≤ r, where r is a constant.
Without loss of generality, we consider a signal x ∈ RN which an ideal classifier will classify to label 1. We
further assume that the closest codeword to x is c1 = f(u1,v1) for u1 and a certain v1. For any i 6= 1, we also
define ci as the codeword with label i that is closest to x:
ci
.
= arg min
c∈Xi
‖x− c‖ .
We define the sets S1 and Si as the spheres of radius r around c1 and ci respectively, namely
S1 .= {b ∈ RN : ‖b− c1‖ < r}
and
Si .= {b ∈ RN : ‖b− ci‖ < r}.
We assume that x ∈ S1. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that, for a vector y ∈ RN , the classifier q(y) outputs
label i if and only if h(y) = h(b) for a certain b ∈ Si.
We consider the problem of finding the smallest targeted perturbation w in magnitude which fools the decoder
q(x + w) into outputting label i 6= 1. Formally, for any x ∈ RN , we define the minimum perturbation size di(x)
needed for target label i as:
di(x)
.
= min
w∈RN ,t∈Si
‖w‖ , s.t. h(x + w) = h(t). (8)
Let us define a quantity d(x, t), which we term as “effective distance between x and t with respect to function
h(·)” as
d(x, t) = min
w∈RN , h(x+w)=h(t)
‖w‖,
Then for any vector x ∈ RN , we can use (8) to upper bound the smallest required perturbation size
di(x) ≤ min
t∈Si
d(x, t).
For an  > 0 and l > 0, we say a classifier has (, l)-robustness at signal x, if
P(g(h(x + w)) = g(h(x))) ≥ 1− ,
where w ∈ RN is randomly sampled uniformly on a sphere1 of radius l, and P means probability. In the following,
we will show that for a small , compressed classifiers can still have (, l)-robustness for l  di(x), namely the
classifier can tolerate large random perturbations while being vulnerable to much smaller adversarial attacks.
3.1 Classifiers with Linear Compression Functions
We first consider the special case where the compression function h(·) is linear, namely h(y) = Ay with A ∈
RM×N , M  N . While this may not be a reasonable model for practical AI systems, analysis of linear compression
functions will yield analytical insights that generalize to nonlinear h(·) as we show later.
Theorem 1. Let y ∈ RN be the input to a classifier, which makes decisions based on the compression function
z = h(y) = Ay, where the elements of A ∈ RM×N (M  N) are i.i.d. following the standard Gaussian distribution
N (0, 1). Let Bi = {z : z = Ab,b ∈ Si} be the compressed image of Si. Then the following statements hold for
1Defined for some given norm, which we will take to be `2 norm throughout this paper.
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arbitrary  > 0, i 6= 1, and a big enough M .
1) With high probability (over the distribution of A), an attacker can design a targeted adversarial attack w with
‖w‖2 ≤
√
1 + 
√
M
N
‖ci − x‖2 − r
such that the classifier is fooled into classifying the signal y = x + w into label i. Moreover, with high probability
(over the distribution of A), an attacker can design an (untargeted) adversarial perturbation w with
‖w‖2 ≤ r −
√
1− 
√
M
N
‖x− c1‖
such that the classifier will not classify y = x + w into label 1.
2) Suppose that w is randomly uniformly sampled from a sphere of radius l in RN . With high probability (over
the distribution of A and w), if
l <
√
1− 
1 + 
‖ci − x‖2 − r√
1 + 
√
M
N
,
the classifier will not classify y = x + w into label i. Moreover, with high probability (over the distribution of A
and w), if
l < (1− )
√
N
M
√
r2 − M
N
‖x− c1‖2,
the classifier still classifies the y = x + w into label 1 correctly.
3) Let w represent a successful adversarial perturbation i.e. the classifier outputs target label i 6= 1 for the input
y = x + w. Then as long as
‖w‖2 < min
ci∈Xi
‖ci − x‖ − r,
our adversarial detection approach will be able to detect the attack.
Proof. 1) We first look at the targeted attack case. For linear decision statistics
d(x, t) = min
w∈RN ,A(x+w)=A(t)
‖w‖,
by solving this optimization problem, we know the optimal w is given by w = A†A(t− x), where A† is the Moore-
Penrose inverse of A. We can see that w is nothing but the projection of (t − x) onto the row space of A. We
denote the projection matrix as P = A†A. Then the smallest magnitude of an effective adversarial perturbation is
upper bounded by
min
t∈Si
d(x, t) = min
t∈Si
‖A†A(t− x)‖ = min
t∈Si
‖P (t− x)‖.
For t ∈ Si, we have
‖P (t− x)‖ = ‖P (ci − x) + P (t− ci)‖ ≥ ‖P (ci − x)‖ − ‖P (t− ci)‖.
One can show that, when Si = {t | ‖t− ci‖ ≤ r}, we can always achieve the equality, namely
min
t∈Si
‖P (t− x)‖ = ‖P (ci − x)‖ − r.
Now we evaluate ‖P (ci−x)‖. Suppose that A’s elements are i.i.d., and follow the standard zero-mean Gaussian
distribution N (0, 1), then the random projection P is uniformly sampled from the Grassmannian Gr(M,RN ). We
can see that the distribution of ‖P (ci−x)‖ is the same as the distribution of the magnitude of the first M elements
of ‖(ci − x)‖o/‖o‖, where o ∈ RN is a vector with its elements being i.i.d. following the standard Gaussian
distribution N (0, 1). From the concentration of measure [15], for any positive  < 1,
P
(
‖P (ci − x)‖ ≤
√
1− ‖ci − x‖
√
M
N
)
≤ e−M
2
4 ,
P
(
‖P (ci − x)‖ ≥
√
1 + ‖ci − x‖
√
M
N
)
≤ e−M
2
12 .
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Then when M is big enough,
min
t∈Si
‖P (t− x)‖ ≤ √1 + 
√
M
N
‖ci − x‖ − r
with high probability, for arbitrary  > 0.
Now let us look at what perturbation w we need such that A(x + w) is not in B1. One can show that A(x + w)
is outside B1 if and only if, ‖P (x − c1 + w)‖ > r. Then by the triangular inequality, the attacker can take an
attack w with ‖w‖ > r − ‖P (x− c1)‖, which is no bigger than r −
√
1− 
√
M
N ‖x− c1‖2 with high probability, for
arbitrary  > 0 and big enough M .
2) If and only if h(x + w) 6= h(t), ∀t ∈ Si, w will not fool the classifier into label i. If h(y) = Ay, “h(x + w) 6=
h(t), ∀t ∈ Si” is equivalent to “‖A(x + w− t)‖ 6= 0, ∀t ∈ Si”, which is in turn equivalent to “‖P (x + w− t)‖ 6= 0,
∀t ∈ Si”, where P is the projection onto the row space of A. Assuming that w is uniformly randomly sampled from
a sphere in RN of radius l <
√
1−
1+‖ci − x‖ − r√1+√MN , then
‖P (x + w − t)‖ = ‖P (ci − x) + P (t− ci)− Pw‖
≥ ‖P (ci − x)‖ − ‖P (t− ci)‖ − ‖Pw‖.
From the concentration inequality,
P
(
‖Pw‖ ≥ √1 + ‖w‖
√
M
N
)
≤ e−M(
2/2−3/3)
2 .
Thus if M is big enough, with high probability,
‖P (x + w − t)‖ ≥ √1− ‖ci − x‖2
√
M
N
− r −√1 + ‖w‖
√
M
N
.
If ‖w‖ = l, ‖P (x + w − t)‖ > 0.
Now let us look at what magnitude we need for a random perturbation w such that A(x+w) is in B1 with high
probability. We know A(x + w) is in B1 if and only if, ‖P (x− c1 + w)‖ < r. Through a large deviation analysis,
one can show that, for any δ > 0 and big enough M , ‖P (x− c1 + w)‖ is smaller than (1 + δ)
√
M
N ‖x− c1‖2 + MN l2
and bigger than (1 − δ)
√
M
N ‖x− ci‖2 + MN l2 with high probability. Thus, for an arbitrary  > 0, if l < (1 −
)
√
N
M
√
r2 − MN ‖x− c1‖2, ‖P (x− c1 + w)‖ < r with high probability, implying the AI classifier still classifies the
y = x + w into Class 1 correctly.
3) Suppose that an AI classifier classifies the input signal y = x + w into label i. We propose to check whether
y belongs to Si. In our model, the signal y belongs to Si only if minci∈Xi ‖y − ci‖ ≤ r. Let us take any codeword
ci ∈ Xi. We show that when ‖w‖ < ‖ci − x‖ − r, we can always detect the adversarial attack if the AI classifier
misclassifies y to that codeword corresponding to label i. In fact, ‖y − ci‖ = ‖(x + w)− ci‖2, which is no smaller
than ‖ci − x‖ − ‖w‖ ≥ ‖ci − x‖ − (‖ci − x‖ − r) > r.
We note that ‖w‖ ≤ minci∈Xi ‖ci − x‖ − r means ‖w‖2 < ‖ci − x‖ − r for every codeword ci, thus implying
that the adversary attack detection technique can detect that y is at more than distance r from every codeword
from Xi.
3.2 Nonlinear Decision Statistics in AI Classifiers
In this subsection, we show that an AI classifier using nonlinear compressed decision statistics h(y) ∈ RM is sig-
nificantly more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than to random perturbations. We will quantify the gap between
how much a random perturbation and a well-designed adversarial attack affect h(y).
Theorem 2. Let us assume that the nonlinear function h(x) : RN → RM is differentiable at x. For  > 0, we define
α() = max
‖w‖≤
(‖h(x + w)− h(x)‖),
and
β(o, ) = ‖h(x + o)− h(x)‖,
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where o is uniformly randomly sampled from a unit sphere. Then
lim
→0
α()
Eo{β(o, )} ≥
√
N
M
,
where Eo means expectation over the distribution of o. If we assume that the entries of the Jacobian matrix
∇h(x) ∈ RM×N are i.i.d. distributed following the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), then, when N is big
enough, with high probability,
lim
→0
α()
Eo{β(o, )} ≥ (1− δ)
√
N +M
M
for any δ > 0.
Before we proceed, we introduce some technical lemmas which are used to establish the gap quantification in
Theorem 2.
Lemma 3. (Section III in [7]) For a random matrix F ∈ RM×N ,M > N with every entry being i.i.d. random
variable distributed accord to Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/M), we can have
P
(
σmax(F ) > 1 +
√
N
M
+ o(1) + t
)
≤ e−Mt2/2,∀t > 0,
and
P
(
σmin(F ) < 1−
√
N
M
+ o(1)− t
)
≤ e−Mt2/2,∀t > 0,
where σmax(F ) is the maximal singular value of F , the σmin(F ) is the smallest singular value of F , and the o(1) is
a small term tending to zero as M →∞.
From Lemma 3, we see that for a random matrix F ∈ RM×N (M < N) with all entries i.i.d. distributed according
to standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), the scaled matrix 1√
N
FT will satisfy for all t > 0
P
(
1√
N
σmax(F ) > 1 +
√
M
N
+ o(1) + t
)
≤ e−Nt2 ,
and
P
(
1√
N
σmin(F ) < 1−
√
M
N
+ o(1)− t
)
≤ e−Nt2/2, (9)
since
σi
(
1√
N
FT
)
=
1√
N
σi(F ),
where σi(F ) is the i-th largest singular value of F .
Proof. (of Theorem 2) From the Taylor expansion, we know
h(x + w) = h(x) +∇h(x)w +
o(‖w‖
2
2)
...
o(‖w‖22)
 (10)
and
h(x + o) = h(x) + ∇h(x)o +
o(
2‖o‖22)
...
o(2‖o‖22)
 , (11)
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where o(‖w‖22)→ 0 and o(2‖o‖22)→ 0 as → 0. Thus
lim
→0
α()
Eo{β(o, )} = lim→0
max‖w‖≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∇h(x)w +
o(‖w‖
2
2)
...
o(‖w‖22)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
Eo

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∇h(x)o +
o(
2‖o‖22)
...
o(2‖o‖22)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

=
σmax(∇h(x))
Eo{‖∇h(x)o‖} , (12)
where σmax(∇h(x)) is the maximal singular value of ∇h(x). Here the random vector o is obtained by first sampling
each entry i.i.d. from the standard Gaussian distribution, and then normalizing the magnitude, i.e.,
o =
1
‖g‖g, (13)
where all entries of g ∈ RN are i.i.d. distributed according to the standard Gaussian distribution.
We first consider the deterministic ∇h(x). Let the SVD of ∇h(x) be ∇h(x) = UΣV ∗ where U ∈ RM×M ,Σ ∈
RM×M , and V ∈ RN×M . Then from the convexity of x2 and Jensen’s inequality, we have
Eo{‖∇h(x)o‖} ≤
√
Eo{‖∇h(x)o‖2}
=
√
Eo{‖UΣV ∗o‖2}
=
√
Eo{‖ΣV ∗o‖2}
≤
√
σ2max(∇h(x))Eo{‖V ∗o‖2}
= σmax(∇h(x))
√√√√Eo{∑Mi=1(g′i)2∑N
j=1(gj)
2
}
= σmax(∇h(x))
√
M
N
,
where g′ = [g′1 g
′
2 · · · g′N ]T is a Gaussian random vector after rotating the Gaussian random vector g by V ∗.
Actually, each element of V ∗o is 1‖g‖2
∑N
k=1(Vki)
∗gk which is a standard Gaussian random variable where (Vki)∗
is the complex conjugate of Vki. We have g
′
i =
∑N
k=1 V¯kigk. We can find a matrix Q ∈ RN×(N−M) such that
[V Q] ∈ RN×N is unitary. When [V Q]∗ acts on a standard Gaussian random vector g, we will get
g′ := [V Q]∗g =

g′1
g′2
...
g′N
 ,
and
‖g‖ = ‖g′‖.
Then
Eo
{∑M
i=1(g
′
i)
2∑N
j=1(gj)
2
}
= Eo
{∑M
i=1(g
′
i)
2∑N
j=1(g
′
j)
2
}
=
M∑
i=1
Eo{ri},
where ri =
(g′i)
2∑N
j=1(g
′
j)
2 .
Since
∑N
i=1Eo{ri} = 1, then from the symmetry of g′i, we have
Eo{ri} = 1
N
.
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This gives
Eo
{∑M
i=1(g
′
i)
2∑N
j=1(gj)
2
}
=
M
N
.
Thus, combining (12), we get
lim
→0
α()
Eo{β(o, )} ≥
√
N
M
.
We now consider the case where the entries of ∇h(x) ∈ RM×N are i.i.d. distributed according to standard
Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). From Lemma 3, we have with high probability that for δ > 0
σmax(∇h(x)) ≥ (1− δ)(
√
N +
√
M). (14)
Since the Gaussian random vector is rotationally invariant, without loss of generality, we take the o as
o = [1 0 · · · 0]T ∈ RN . (15)
Then the ∇h(x) is a vector with all entries being i.i.d. distributed according to standard Gaussian distribution.
From the convexity of x2 and Jensen’s inequality, we have
E∇h(x){‖∇h(x)o‖} ≤
√
E∇h(x){‖∇h(x)o‖2} =
√
M.
For a norm function f(x) = ‖x‖ : Rn → R, since
|f(x)− f(y)| = |‖x‖ − ‖y‖| ≤ ‖x− y‖,
then the function f(x) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1. Then for ‖∇h(x)o‖, we have for every
t ≥ 0,
P(
∣∣‖∇h(x)o‖ − E∇h(x)[‖∇h(x)o‖]∣∣ ≥ t) ≤ 2e− t22 .
This means the ‖∇h(x)o‖ is concentrated at E∇h(x){‖∇h(x)o‖} which is less than
√
M .
Thus, combining (12) and (14), we have with high probability
lim
→0
α()
Eo{∇h(x)} ≥ (1− δ)
√
N +
√
M√
M
≥ (1− δ)
√
M +N√
N
= (1− δ)
√
M +N
M
.
4 Experimental Results
We now present two sets of experimental results to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed defense against
adversarial attacks.
4.1 Speech Recognition
Our first set of experiments were based on a popular voice recognition AI classifier DeepSpeech2. The experimental
setup is illustrated in Fig. 4; a visual comparison with the abstract model in Fig.2 shows how the various functional
blocks are implemented.
The experiment 3 consisted of choosing sentences randomly from the classic 19-th century novel “A Tale of
Two Cities.” A Linux text-to-speech (T2S) software, Pico2wave, converted a chosen sentence e.g. u1 into a female
2https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech
3https://github.com/Hui-Xie/AdversarialDefense
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Figure 4: System Modules of Using Correlation Coefficients to Detect Adversarial Attacks
Table 1: Text examples used for speech recognition. First column: original text (or benign samples). Second
column: text recognized by DeepSpeech from the original text. Third column: text recognized by DeepSpeech
from the adversarial text (adversarial samples). All the the original texts are perturbed to be a target sentence “he
travels the fastest who travels alone”.
Original Text Original Text Recognized Adversarial Text Recognized
it was the best of times it was the best of times he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the worst of times it was the worst of times he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the age of wisdom it was the age of witdom he travels the fastest who ravels alone
it was the age of foolishness it was the age of foolishness he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the epoch of belief it was the eot of belief he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the epoch of incredulity it was the epoth of imfidulity he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the season of Light it was the season of light he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the season of Darkness it was the season of darkness he travels the fastest who travels alone
it was the spring of hope it was the spring of hope he travels the fatest who travels alone
it was the winter of despair it was the winter of this care he traves the fastest who travels alone
voice wave file. The use of a T2S system for generating the source audio signal (instead of human-spoken audio)
effectively allows us to hold the all “irrelevant” variables v constant, and thus renders the signal synthesis block in
Fig. 2 as a deterministic function of just the input label u1.
Let x denote the samples of this source audio signal. This audio signal is played over a PC speaker and recorded
by a USB microphone on another PC. Let y1 denote the samples of this recorded wave file. The audio playback
and recording was performed in a quiet room with no audible echoes or distortions, so this “channel” can be
approximately modeled as a simple AWGN channel: y1 = αx + w1, where α is a scalar representing audio signal
attenuation and w1 is random background noise. In our experiment, the SNR
.
= α
2‖x‖2
‖w1‖2 was approximately 28 dB.
We input y1 into a voice recognition system, specifically, the Mozilla implementation DeepSpeech V0.1.1 based
on TensorFlow. The 10 detailed sentences are demonstrated in Table 1. We then used Nicholas Carlini’s adver-
sarial attack Python script4 with Deep Speech (V0.1.1) through gradient back-propagation to generate a targeted
adversarial audio signal y2 = y1 + w2 where w2 is a small adversarial perturbation that causes the DeepSpeech
voice recognition system to predict a completely different sentence u2. Thus, we have a “clean” audio signal y1,
and a “targeted corrupted” adversarial audio signal y2 that upon playback is effectively indistinguishable from y1,
but successfully fools DeepSpeech into outputting a different target sentence. In our experiment, the power of y2
over the adversarial perturbation w2 was approximately 35 dB.
We then implemented a version of our proposed defense to detect whether the output of the DeepSpeech is wrong,
whether due to noises or adversarial attacks. For this purpose, we fed the decoded text output of the DeepSpeech
system into the same T2S software Pico2Wave, to generate a reconstructed female voice wave file, denoted by xˆ.
We then performed a simple cross-correlation of a portion of the reconstructed signal (representing approximately
4https://nicholas.carlini.com/code
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Table 2: Correlations between texts. Each row corresponds to the corresponding text in Table 1.
Original and record Record and adversarial Record and reconstruction Adversarial and reconstruction
0.8746 0.9999 0.03 0.04
0.8971 0.9999 0.00 0.01
0.8898 0.9997 -0.01 0.01
0.9533 0.9999 0.00 -0.03
0.8389 0.9999 0.00 0.04
0.8028 0.9999 0.03 -0.01
0.8858 0.9999 0.00 -0.02
0.9390 0.9998 0.01 0.02
0.8684 0.9999 0.00 0.01
0.9114 0.9999 -0.05 0.06
10% reconstruction of the original number of samples in x) with the input signal y to the DeepSpeech classifier:
ρmax(xˆ,y) = max
m
∣∣∣∣∣∑
n
xˆ[n]y[n−m]
∣∣∣∣∣ , (16)
where x[n] denotes the n-th entry of x. If ρmax is smaller than a threshold (0.4), we declare that the speech
recognition classification is wrong. The logic behind this test is as follows. When the input signal is y1 i.e. the
non-adversarial-perturbed signal, the DeepSpeech successfully outputs the correct label uˆ ≡ u1,which results in
xˆ ≡ x. Since y1 is just a noisy version of x, it will be highly correlated with xˆ. On the other hand, for the
adversarial-perturbed input y2, the reconstructed signal xˆ is completely different from x and therefore can be
expected to be practically uncorrelated with y2.
Fig.5 shows the cross-correlation ρmax(xˆ,y) for 10 sets of recorded signals (a) with and (b) without adversarial
perturbations (red triangles and blue circles respectively in Fig. 5). More details about the quantitative results can
be found in Table 2. The adversarial perturbations all successfully fool the DeepSpeech AI to output the target
text u2 =“he travels the fastest who travels alone”. We see that the observed correlations for the adversarial signals
are always very small, and are therefore successfully detected by our correlation test. Interestingly, some of the
non-adversarial signals yield low correlations as well, but this is because the DeepSpeech cannot decode perfectly
even when there are no adversarial attacks present.
4.2 Image Classification
Our second set of experimental results are for image classification on MNIST data set [29]. For MNIST data set [29]
which is a collection of hand-written digits, there are 60, 000 samples in its training data set, and 10,000 samples
in its testing data set. Each of the digit image sample is a gray-scale image of size 28× 28× 1 and has totally 784
pixels.
We borrow a trained neural network and adversarial example generation implementation from Siddhartha Rao
Kamalakara 5. A convolutional neural network (CNN) is used for MNIST digit classification. This CNN classifier is
trained to achieve a testing classification accuracy of 99.10%. Adversarial samples for this classifier were generated
using the FGSM method [22]. Let us denote by xi the benign samples in class i, and denote by xi→j an adversarial
sample which is in class i but misclassified as in class j 6= i. In the experiments, we generate 9 adversarial
images for each testing sample, for each targeted class. For example, there are about 1,000 images in the testing
data set which correspond to digital 1, and we generate, for each of them, 9 corresponding adversarial images,
x1→0,x1→2, · · · ,x1→9. Adversarial samples generated by fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [22] for fooling the
CNN classifier into making wrong decisions are shown in Figure 6.
In the following, we present experimental results on proposed method for detecting adversarial samples, i.e., the
pixel prediction method, and the generative model based optimization approach. Both these approaches originate
from the same idea presented at the end of Section 2, i.e., solving
cj(y, p(y), ta(y)) = arg min
c∈Xj ,p(c)∈N (p(y))
‖ta(y)− ta(c)‖, (17)
5https://github.com/srk97/targeted-adversarial-mnist
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Figure 5: The change of cross correlation coefficients ρ(xˆ,y). Blue circles indicate ρ between input signals y1
without adversarial attack and their corresponding reconstructed signals xˆ from decoded labels, and red triangles
indicate ρ between input signals y2 with adversarial attacks and its coresponding reconstructed signals xˆ. Low “blue
circles” mean DeepSpeech runs into recognition failure in several error characters, even if no adversarial attacks are
present.
and then evaluating
dj(y, p(y), ta(y)) = ‖ta(y)− ta(cj(y, p(y), ta(y)))‖ .
The pixel prediction method uses unmasked pixels of an image to predict the behavior of the masked pixels, and
then evaluate ‖ta(y)− ta(cj(y, p(y), ta(y)))‖ over these predicted pixels. Thus the function ta(y) for the prediction
network is the projection mapping to the masked pixels, and p(y) is the projection mapping to the unmasked pixels.
In the optimization based generative model method, we use latent variables to generate full images (codewords cj)
for label j, and then minimize ‖y − cj(y)‖, where ta(y) is the identity mapping, namely ta(y) = y.
Evaluation Metric of Detection Performance Let us denote by Nben and Nadv respectively the total number
of benign samples, and the total number of adversarial samples. We denote by N cben the number of benign samples
which are correctly detected as benign samples. Similarly, we denote by N cadv the number of adversarial samples
which are correctly detected as adversarial samples. We define the false alarm rate and missing rate as
ρalarm =
Nben −N cben
Nben
, ρmissing =
Nadv −N cadv
Nadv
, (18)
Figure 6: Examples of benign samples, perturbations, and adversarial samples.
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and define the accuracy of correct detection of benign sample and the accuracy of correct detection of adversarial
samples respectively as
ρcben =
N cben
Nben
, ρcadv =
N cadv
Nadv
. (19)
4.2.1 Defense using the Pixel Prediction Network
We design a pixel prediction neural network which uses part of pixels in an image to predict the rest pixels of it,
and we refer to it as the pixel predictor. For example, given an image x ∈ RN with N = 784 pixels, we can sample
a subset Sin ⊂ [N ] of all its pixels such that |Sin| := Nin = 0.9 ∗N ≈ 705 pixels and use it as input sample for the
pixel predictor. The rest Nout = N − Nin = 79 pixels are used as output sample of the pixel predictor, and are
specified by Sout = [N ] \ Sin where |Sout| = Nout. The set of such new input-output pairs is used to train and test
the pixel predictor.
For a given sampling percentage pctg ∈ (0, 1), we consider different sampling patterns, i.e., central square
sampling (CSS), central row sampling (CRS). For an image sample x of width W and height H, the CSS procedure
will first compute L = d√(1− pctg) ∗Ne, and then take the central square with side length L of the image x as the
output of pixel predictors, which means Nout = L
2. The CRS procedure will first compute L = d(1 − pctg) ∗ Ne,
and then take the central L rows of the sample x as the output of the pixel predictors, which means Nout = WL.
After we get the predictions for masked pixel values, we can compute the mean squared error (MSE) for predicted
values and the ground truth values, i.e.,
MSE =
1
Nout
‖xSout − xˆSout‖2, (20)
where xˆSout is predicted by the pixel predictor.
Instead of training a universal pixel predictor, we train class-dependent pixel predictors for different classes.
Let us denote by MSEi→j the MSE computed from adversarial samples in class i but missclassified as in class j,
j 6= i, and denote by MSEi the MSE computed from benign samples in class i. For example, we can take all the
samples with digit 3 from the MNIST training data (totally 5,638 out of 60,000) and testing data (totally 1,010
out of 10,000). Once the pixel predictors are well-trained, we can use them for detecting adversarial attacks. More
specifically, suppose we have an adversarial sample which is digit 3 but misclassified by the CNN classifier as digit
8. Then we will test the pixel predictor (trained on benign samples from class 8) on this adversarial sample, and
compute the corresponding MSE. If MSE for this adversarial image MSE3→8 is much larger than the MSE of the
pixel predictor over the MNIST testing data MSE8, i.e.,
MSE3→8 > cMSE8, (21)
where c is a preset constant, then we claim the given image is an attacking attempt.
(a) Central square sampling (b) Central row sampling
Figure 7: Different sampling patters for pixel predictors with sampling percentage 0.95. First row: original images.
Second row: sampled images. Third row: reconstructed images.
Structure of Pixel Prediction Neural Network For MNIST data set, the pixel predictors are fully connected
neural networks (FNN). The FNN has totally three layers, with 300, 300, Nout neurons in the first, second, and
third layer, respectively. The activation functions used in each layer are sigmoid functions. We denote the FNN
pixel predictors trained on digit 0, 1, · · · , and 9 by FNN0, FNN1, · · · , and FNN9, respectively. All the FNNi are
trained with learning rate 0.002 and batch size 128, and the training process terminates after 20 epochs. In Figure
16
Table 3: Evaluation of reconstruction of MSE using the pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different
classes. We show the inference MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 0. All
the adversarial samples from other classes are misclassified as class 0. Each xi means benign or good samples from
class i, and each xj→i means adversarial samples from class j 6= i but misclassified in class i.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.05
x1→0 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.40
x2→0 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.29
x3→0 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.32
x4→0 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.32
x5→0 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.25
x6→0 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.22
x7→0 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.24 0.22 0.25
x8→0 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.41
x9→0 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.32
Table 4: Evaluation of reconstruction MSE using pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different
classes. We show the inference MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 0. All
the adversarial samples from other classes are misclassified as class 0. Each xi means benign or good samples from
class i, and each xj→i means adversarial samples from class j 6= i but misclassified as class i.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04
x1→0 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.11
x2→0 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.12
x3→0 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15
x4→0 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.13
x5→0 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13
x6→0 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12
x7→0 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.10
x8→0 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.16
x9→0 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.14
7, we give illustrations for pixel prediction performance of FNN8 over benign samples in class 8 and adversarial
samples when different sampling patterns are used.
Effects of Sampling Percentage For CSS pattern, we now consider a given target class, and generate adversarial
samples from all the rest 9 classes which are misclassified by the classifier as this target class. We train a FNN pixel
predictor using benign samples from the target class, and then evaluate the trained FNN pixel predictor over the
adversarial samples from the other 9 classes. Note that there are about 1,000 benign samples in the testing data
set for each class. When we evaluate the performance of FNN0, we will compute the MSE it gives for the 1,000
benign samples x0, the 1,000 adversarial samples x1→0,..., the 1,000 adversarial samples x9→0.
The readers are invited to see Table 3 and Figure 8a for performance of FNN pixel predictor trained on benign
samples in class 0, and evaluated over adversarial samples from other classes which are misclassified as class 0. See
Table 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and Figure 8b,16a,16b,17a,17b,18a,18b,19a,19b in Appendix for other cases.
Similarly for CRS pattern, we consider a given target class, and generate adversarial samples from all the rest 9
classes which are misclassified by the classifier as this target class. We train a FNN pixel predictor using benign
samples from the target class, and then evaluate the trained FNN pixel predictor over the adversarial samples from
the other 9 classes. See Table 4 and Figure and Figure 9a for performance of FNN pixel predictor trained on benign
samples in class 0, and evaluated over adversarial samples from other classes which are misclassified as class 0. See
Table 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,26,27, 28 and Figure 9b,20a,20b,21a,21b,22a,22b,23a,23b in Appendix for more results.
Distribution of the Reconstruction Mean Squared Errors We now show how the MSE will be distributed for
benign samples and adversarial samples. According to the results obtained under different sampling percentages,
17
(a) FNN0 is used. (b) FNN1 is used.
Figure 8: Effects of sampling percentages.
(a) FNN0 is used. (b) FNN1 is used.
Figure 9: Effects of sampling percentages.
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we notice that pctg = 0.95 achieves relatively better results than other choices, i.e., the gap between MSE for benign
samples and that for adversarial samples is bigger. Now we use a fixed sampling percentage pctg = 0.95, and all
the other parameters are the same as in previous experiments. For each trained pixel prediction network FNNi,
we will use it to compute the MSE for each benign sample in class i in the testing data set (about 1,000 images),
and we then plot the histogram for them. Similarly, for all the adversarial samples from all other classes (about
1,000 images for each class, and totally about 9,000 images), we do the same.
We first present results for the central square sampling pattern. The MSE distributions for FNN0 on benign sam-
ples and adversarial samples are shown in Figure 10a. When central row sampling pattern is used, the MSE distribu-
tions for FNN0 on benign samples and adversarial samples are shown in Figure 11a. Note that the vertical axis
represents the probability density . More results can be found in Figure 10b, 24a,24b,25a,25b,26a,26b,27a,27b,
11b, 28a,28b,29a,29b,30a,30b,31a,31b.
(a) MSE distributions when FNN0 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN1 is used.
Figure 10: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions when FNN0 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN1 is used.
Figure 11: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
From the tables and results for other cases in the appendix, we can have some interesting statistical observations.
First of all, when FNNi is given, then no matter what sampling percentage is used, the xi can achieve the lowest
MSE when compared with xj→i, j 6= i for most of the time. Though for some FNNi (i.e., i = 2, 8), the pixel
prediction network can assign larger MSE for xi than the one assigned to xj→i, j 6= i for some choices of sampling
percentages, the FNNi can always assign a larger MSE to xj→i, j 6= i when the sampling percentage is big enough
(i.e., 0.95). With a big enough sampling percentage, the MSE of xj→i, j 6= i can be several times as big as that
of xi. Thus, it can be statistically easy to separate adversarial samples and benign samples due to the big gap
between their MSEs. For example, for FNN0 with a sampling percentage of 95%, we can choose a threshold of
0.10, all the adversarial samples from other classes achieve higher MSE than 0.10, while the benign samples achieve
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Table 5: Detection performance of prediction neural network. Central square sampling pattern is used with a
sampling percentage of 0.95.
Prediction network FNN0 FNN1 FNN2 FNN7
Threshold 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.11
Correct detection of benign sample 91.33% 97.89% 83.04% 87.65%
False alarm rate 8.67% 2.11% 16.96% 12.35%
Correct detection of adversarial sample 93.63% 96.03% 76.01% 86.41%
Missing rate 6.37% 3.97% 23.99% 13.59%
a MSE of 0.05. Then we can guarantee 100.00% accuracy of detecting adversarial samples and benign samples.
These observations also hold for the central row sampling pattern, although less obvious.
Missing Rate and False Alarm Rate We now show the tradeoff of missing rate and false alarm rate. In the
central square sampling case, for each prediction neural network, we take different thresholds from 0.05 to 0.70 for
determining whether a sample is benign or adversarial. For each particular threshold, we compute the corresponding
missing rate defined in (18). Thus, for each prediction network, we can have a sequence of such missing rate and
false alarm rate pairs. We plot relation between missing rate and false alarm, and the result is shown in Figure 12a.
Similarly for central row sampling case, we take the thresholds from 0.05 to 0.50. The result is shown in Figure
12b. From the results in Figure 12a and 12b, no matter which prediction network and which sampling pattern are
considered, we can see that when we increase the threshold from 0.05 to 0.5 or 0.7, the false alarm decreases and
the missing rate increases.
(a) Central square sampling pattern. (b) Central row sampling pattern.
Figure 12: Tradeoff between missing rate and false alarm.
We assume that the two types of mistakes have the same risk, and use a threshold achieving a balance between
missing rate and false alarm rate. For a given prediction neural network and a given threshold, we also give
quantitative detection performance metrics for some digit cases for illustration of the Figure 12a and 12b in Table 5
and 6. From the results, we can see that the pixel prediction detection (PPD) method, though simple, can achieve
reasonably good detection performance. For some cases, it can achieve even more than 95.00% detection accuracy
for both benign samples and adversarial samples (i.e., FNN1). However, for some cases, it can only achieve about
80.00% detection accuracy.
4.2.2 Adversarial Detection Using Generative Models
In this section, we present a general method for detecting adversarial attacks which follows directly from our
theoretical results. Specifically, according to our feature compression hypothesis, adversarial fragility is a direct
consequence of a compression process that maps high dimensional inputs to a set of low-dimensional latent variables;
our proposed defense uses a reverse process i.e. a feature decompression to regenerate a rich set of “denoised features”
conditioned on the classifier output. These regenerated features are then compared against the raw input signal for
statistical consistency.
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Table 6: Detection performance of prediction neural network. Central row sampling pattern is used with a sampling
percentage of 0.95.
Prediction network FNN0 FNN1 FNN2 FNN7
Threshold 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07
Correct detection of benign sample 93.06% 99.47% 79.13% 81.71%
False alarm rate 6.94% 0.53% 20.83% 18.29%
Correct detection of adversarial sample 91.50% 92.16% 81.18% 85.79%
Missing rate 8.50% 7.84% 18.82% 14.21%
Different from the pixel prediction approach where we use partial input pixels to estimate the rest, the detection
approach based on generative model will use latent codes to estimate the whole image. We call models as generators
G : RNlow → RNhigh which can map latent codes in RNlow to inputs in RNhigh . By training generators for each data
class using the benign samples from this class, the output of generators can approximate input samples in RNhigh .
Once the generators are well-trained, for a given input image x in RNhigh which is classified by a classifier as i, we
then find a latent code z ∈ RNlow such that Gi(z) is the best approximation of x where Gi : RNlow → RNhigh is a
generator trained using benign samples from class i. This is achieved by solving
min
z
‖x−Gi(z)‖22. (22)
Once z is found, we can get the approximation error ‖x − Gi(z)‖22 which can be used as a criterion for deciding
whether the given input is an adversarial sample or not.
For MNIST data set, we will use generators from deep convolutional generative adversarial networks (DCGANs).
Firstly, we scale all the image samples from 28 × 28 to 64 × 64. Secondly, we train 10 DCGANs for the 10 digit
classes, i.e., DCGANi is trained using all the samples from digit class i. Once the DCGAN is well-trained, the
generator of it will map low dimensional vectors z ∈ R100 to digit images in high dimensional space R64×64. Thirdly,
for an image x, we will try to find a vector z ∈ R100 such that the output of the DCGANi will be the optimal
class-i approximation of x. This can be modeled as the following optimization
min
z∈R100
‖x−DCGANi(z)‖22, (23)
where xi ∈ R64×64 is a digital image sample from class i. Fourthly, once we find the solution z using gradient
descent algorithm, we will calculate the mean squared error (MSE) 1642 ‖xi −DCGANi(z)‖22.
We say a sample is a benign sample if it can be correctly classified by a classifier, and denote it by xi. We say
a sample is an adversarial sample if it is from class j, but is misclassified as in class i, and we denote it by xj→i
where j 6= i. In the following, we will investigate for a given well-trained generator DCGANi, how the MSE will
behave when we solve (23) with different types of digit images.
The experimental set up is: (1) We add a regularization term to restrict the searching space for z, i.e.,
min
z∈R100
‖xi −DCGANi(z)‖2 + λ‖z‖2.
(2) We normalize each xi ∈ R784 over its entries, i.e., we obtain xi−mean(xi)std(xi) , where
mean(xi) =
1
784
784∑
j=1
[xi]j ,
and
std(xi) =
√√√√ 1
784
784∑
j=1
([xi]j −mean(xi))2,
where [xi]j is the j-th element of sample xi. The normalization step will make all the pixels concentrated at 0
with a standard deviation 1, i.e., concentrated within [−1, 1]. This will coincide greatly with the range of the pixels
generated by the generator which uses a tanh activation function. (3) We record the z which achieves the smallest
MSE in numerically solving the regularized optimization problem.
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(a) Benign sample. (b) Adversarial sample.
Figure 13: Approximation performance of DCGAN9.
Remarks: (1) the process of resizing image sample from R28×28 to R64×64 is not necessary, and the 28 × 28
can be directly used. We use this extra step just to make the image size the same as that accepted by the DCGAN
we have trained. The readers can train their own DCGANs using different image sizes. (2) The motivation for
adding regularization term is to regularize the capability of the generators for approximating images. Without
regularization, the generators can be powerful enough to approximate images out of its class, i.e., the generator
of DCGAN9 can give a good approximation for adversarial samples from class 0 but misclassified as 9, by finding
some z in R100, thus achieving low MSE for adversarial samples. Regularization can force the generator to generate
only images from its corresponding class. (3) The normalization process is not necessary either. We introduce this
step because we use DCGAN producing pixel values within [−1, 1].
Single Sample Detection In the experiments, we take DCGAN9, and the λ = 100. The learning rate is 0.05, and
the Adam optimizer is used for searching the optimal z using gradient descent. The search algorithm will terminate
after 2500 iterations. Every time, only single image is fed to the trained generator. The MSEs for adversarial from
different classes but misclassified as class 9 are presented in Table 7. From the results, we can see that the MSE
for adversarial sample can be tens times as big as that for benign sample, which can guarantee very accurate and
robust detection performance. The visualized results are shown in Figure 13a, 13b. For other DCGANs, the MSEs
are recorded in Table 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 in Appendix.
Table 7: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN9. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→9 x1→9 x2→9 x3→9 x4→9 x5→9 x6→9 x7→9 x8→9 x9
# 0.98 1.44 0.98 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.99 0.08
Effect of Regularization Parameter All the setup is the same as previous sections unless specified explicitly.
We fix the learning rate to be 0.05, and take regularization parameter λ to be 0, 1, 10, 100, 1,000, and 10,000
respectively. We use DCGAN9 and adversarial sample from class 0 to do the experiments. The results are recorded
in Table 8. From the results, we can see that when there is no regularization term, the generator can find good
approximation for adversarial samples. But the MSE for adversarial sample is much larger than that for benign
samples, i.e., a gap of approximately 50 times the MSE of benign samples. As we increase λ, the MSEs for both
benign sample and adversarial sample will increase first and then remain around a particular value. In the following,
we will use a fixed regularization parameter λ = 100.
MSE Distribution and Detection Accuracy In this section, we will evaluate the detection accuracy of the
Table 8: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN9 under different regularization parameter λ.
MSE adv. 0 adv. 3 adv. 5 ben. 9
λ = 0 0.53 0.71 0.75 0.01
λ = 1 0.65 0.84 0.88 0.04
λ = 10 0.89 1.00 0.98 0.06
λ = 100 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.08
λ = 1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.08
λ = 10000 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.09
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Figure 14: Missing rate and false alarm tradeoff.
proposed method statistically. We use DCGAN0 as an example to illustrate the idea. The DCGAN0 will produce
an MSE for each given image, we compare it with a threshold τ . If the MSE is much greater than τ , then it will be
reported as an adversarial sample. Otherwise, it is reported as a benign sample. For all the benign samples from
class 0, we compute the detection accuracy of benign samples ρcben defined in (19). For adversarial samples from
class j 6= 0, we compute the detection accuracy of adversarial samples ρcadv defined in (19). The missing rate and
the false alarm rate can be computed according to (18).
For each generator DCGANi, we randomly take 90 benign samples from class i, and another 90 adversarial
samples from classes j 6= i. For example, we can randomly take 90 benign samples from class 1. We randomly take
adversarial samples from class 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 which are misclassified as class 1, and the total number is 90. We
present the quantitative results in Table 9 and 10. Similar to pixel prediction detection method, we choose different
thresholds, and the plot the relation between missing rate and false alarm in Figure 14. The distributions of MSEs
for each generator are shown in Figure 15a,15b,32a,32b,33a,33b,34a,34b, 35a,35b.
Table 9: Detection performance of generative models. Threshold 0.30 is used for all generators.
Generators DCGAN0 DCGAN1 DCGAN2 DCGAN3 DCGAN4
Correct detection of benign sample 95.56% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
False alarm rate 4.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Correct detection of adversarial sample 96.67% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Missing rate 3.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
From the Table 9, 10, Figure 15a and results in the appendix, we can see that the detection method based on
generative model can achieve high performance, i.e., achieving more than 95.00% detection accuracy for all cases
and well separated MSEs for samples from different classes.
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Table 10: Detection performance of generative models. Threshold 0.30 is used for all generators.
Generators DCGAN5 DCGAN6 DCGAN7 DCGAN8 DCGAN9
Correct detection of benign sample 98.89% 100.00% 100.00% 96.67% 98.89%
False alarm rate 1.11% 0.00% 0.00% 3.33% 1.11%
Correct detection of adversarial sample 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Missing rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(a) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN0.
(b) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN1.
Figure 15: Top row: MSE distribution of benign samples. Bottom row: MSE distribution of adversarial samples.
5 Conclusions
Based on the feature compression property, we explained the fragility of AI classifiers from the point view of
information theory. The theoretical results apply to all classifiers which learn low dimensional representations
before making classification decisions. We proposed two methods for detecting adversarial samples based on the
idea of ”decompression”, i.e., pixel prediction detection (PPD) method and optimization-based generative detection
(OGD) approach. The former method can achieve as high as 95.00% detection accuracy for both benign samples
and adversarial samples for some digit classes, but as low as about 80.00% for some other cases. The latter method
can perform well both statistically and for individual sample, and can achieve more than 95.00% detection accuracy
for all the experiments we conducted. For some cases, it can even achieve 100.00% detection accuracy for both the
benign samples and adversarial samples. These experimental results supports our theoretical claims and show the
effectiveness of the proposed idea for adversarial detection.
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A Effects of Sampling Percentage
A.1 Central Square Sampling Pattern
Table 11: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 1.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→1 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.30
x1 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05
x2→1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25
x3→1 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.27
x4→1 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.31
x5→1 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.30
x6→1 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.31
x7→1 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.27
x8→1 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.27
x9→1 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.35 0.31
Table 12: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 2.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→2 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.27
x1→2 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.18
x2 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.09
x3→2 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.30
x4→2 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.18
x5→2 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.30 0.29
x6→2 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.26
x7→2 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.12
x8→2 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.25
x9→2 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.19
Table 13: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 3.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→3 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.28
x1→3 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.24
x2→3 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.26
x3 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.12
x4→3 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.29
x5→3 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.24
x6→3 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.31
x7→3 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.26
x8→3 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.25
x9→3 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.25
28
(a) FNN2 is used. (b) FNN3 is used.
Figure 16: Effects of sampling percentages.
(a) FNN4 is used. (b) FNN5 is used.
Figure 17: Effects of sampling percentages.
(a) FNN6 is used. (b) FNN7 is used.
Figure 18: Effects of sampling percentages.
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Table 14: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 4.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→4 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.34
x1→4 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.31
x2→4 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.21
x3→4 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.35
x4 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11
x5→4 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.30
x6→4 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.21
x7→4 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.22
x8→4 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26
x9→4 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.15
Table 15: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 5.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→5 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.22
x1→5 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.34
x2→5 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.35
x3→5 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.19
x4→5 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.32
x5 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13
x6→5 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.27
x7→5 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.30
x8→5 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.33
x9→5 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.32
Table 16: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 6.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→6 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.18
x1→6 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.29
x2→6 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.23
x3→6 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.25
x4→6 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22
x5→6 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25
x6 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11
x7→6 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.25
x8→6 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.26
x9→6 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.23
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Table 17: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 7.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→7 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.14
x1→7 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.21
x2→7 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.18
x3→7 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.31
x4→7 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.21
x5→7 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27
x6→7 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.31 0.30 0.26
x7 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.05
x8→7 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.32
x9→7 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22
Table 18: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 8.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→8 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.35 0.41
x1→8 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.15
x2→8 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.26
x3→8 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.22
x4→8 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.22
x5→8 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.26
x6→8 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.26
x7→8 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.33
x8 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.11
x9→8 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.21
Table 19: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 9.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→9 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.28
x1→9 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.30
x2→9 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.20
x3→9 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26
x4→9 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.14
x5→9 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26
x6→9 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.23
x7→9 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19
x8→9 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27
x9 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
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(a) FNN8 is used. (b) FNN9 is used.
Figure 19: Effects of sampling percentages.
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A.2 Central Rows Sampling Pattern
Table 20: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 1.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→1 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.19
x1 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
x2→1 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
x3→1 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13
x4→1 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.18
x5→1 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13
x6→1 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18
x7→1 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13
x8→1 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12
x9→1 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
Table 21: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 2.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→2 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.17
x1→2 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03
x2 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04
x3→2 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11
x4→2 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13
x5→2 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13
x6→2 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15
x7→2 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05
x8→2 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09
x9→2 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12
Table 22: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 3.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→3 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.22
x1→3 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05
x2→3 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09
x3 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05
x4→3 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14
x5→3 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09
x6→3 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14
x7→3 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.09
x8→3 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.07
x9→3 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12
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(a) FNN2 is used. (b) FNN3 is used.
Figure 20: Effects of sampling percentages.
(a) FNN4 is used. (b) FNN5 is used.
Figure 21: Effects of sampling percentages.
(a) FNN6 is used. (b) FNN7 is used.
Figure 22: Effects of sampling percentages.
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Table 23: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 4.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→4 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19
x1→4 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12
x2→4 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11
x3→4 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13
x4 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
x5→4 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14
x6→4 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11
x7→4 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15
x8→4 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11
x9→4 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07
Table 24: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 5.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→5 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.20
x1→5 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
x2→5 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13
x3→5 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08
x4→5 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14
x5 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05
x6→5 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
x7→5 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.14
x8→5 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11
x9→5 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14
Table 25: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 6.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→6 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11
x1→6 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07
x2→6 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
x3→6 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11
x4→6 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.12
x5→6 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
x6 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05
x7→6 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10
x8→6 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11
x9→6 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12
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Table 26: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 7.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→7 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.17
x1→7 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07
x2→7 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07
x3→7 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
x4→7 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14
x5→7 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16
x6→7 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16
x7 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
x8→7 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13
x9→7 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
Table 27: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 8.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→8 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.28
x1→8 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05
x2→8 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12
x3→8 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10
x4→8 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16
x5→8 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
x6→8 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17
x7→8 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14
x8 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06
x9→8 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14
Table 28: Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference
MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 9.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
x0→9 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.17
x1→9 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09
x2→9 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
x3→9 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
x4→9 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08
x5→9 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
x6to9 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.11
x7→9 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11
x8→9 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10
x9 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05
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(a) FNN8 is used. (b) FNN9 is used.
Figure 23: Effects of sampling percentages.
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B Distributions of Mean Square Errors in Pixel Prediction Method
B.1 Central Square Sampling Pattern
(a) MSE distributions when FNN2 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN3 is used.
Figure 24: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions when FNN4 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN5 is used.
Figure 25: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
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(a) MSE distributions when FNN6 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN7 is used.
Figure 26: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions when FNN8 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN9 is used.
Figure 27: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
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B.2 Central Row Sampling Pattern
(a) MSE distributions when FNN2 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN3 is used.
Figure 28: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions when FNN4 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN5 is used.
Figure 29: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions when FNN6 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN7 is used.
Figure 30: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
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(a) MSE distributions when FNN8 is used. (b) MSE distributions when FNN9 is used.
Figure 31: Top row: benign samples. Bottom row: adversarial samples.
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C Single Sample Detection using Generative Model
Table 29: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN8. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→8 x1→8 x2→8 x3→8 x4→8 x5→8 x6→8 x7→8 x8 x9→8
# 1 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.97 0.99 0.90 0.09 0.78
Table 30: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN7. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→7 x1→7 x2→7 x3→7 x4→7 x5→7 x6→7 x7 x8→7 x9→7
# 1 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.05 1.00 1.00
Table 31: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN6. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→6 x1→6 x2→6 x3→6 x4→6 x5→6 x6→6 x7→6 x8→6 x9→6
# 1 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.97 1.00
Table 32: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN5. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→5 x1→5 x2→5 x3→5 x4→5 x5 x6→5 x7→5 x8→5 x9→5
# 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.12 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92
Table 33: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN4. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→4 x1→4 x2→4 x3→4 x4 x5→4 x6→4 x7→4 x8→4 x9→4
# 1 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.92 0.95 0.98 0.91
Table 34: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN3. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→3 x1→3 x2→3 x3 x4→3 x5→3 x6→3 x7→3 x8→3 x9→3
# 1 0.85 0.96 0.86 0.08 0.97 0.83 1.00 0.90 0.81 0.82
Table 35: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN2. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→2 x1→2 x2 x3→2 x4→2 x5→2 x6→2 x7→2 x8→2 x9→2
# 1 0.84 1.00 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.87 0.89
Table 36: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN1. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0→1 x1 x2→1 x3→1 x4→1 x5→1 x6→1 x7→1 x8→1 x9→1
# 1 1.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 37: Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN0. Single image sample is used.
MSE x0 x1→0 x2→0 x3→0 x4→0 x5→0 x6→0 x7→0 x8→0 x9→0
# 1 0.17 0.85 0.55 0.66 0.81 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.69
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D Detection Performance of Generative Model
(a) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN2.
(b) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN3.
Figure 32: Top row: MSE distribution of benign samples. Bottom row: MSE distribution of adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN4.
(b) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN5.
Figure 33: Top row: MSE distribution of benign samples. Bottom row: MSE distribution of adversarial samples.
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(a) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN6.
(b) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN7.
Figure 34: Top row: MSE distribution of benign samples. Bottom row: MSE distribution of adversarial samples.
(a) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN8.
(b) MSE distributions of samples when processed by
DCGAN9.
Figure 35: Top row: MSE distribution of benign samples. Bottom row: MSE distribution of adversarial samples.
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